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Abstract
As social media platforms and the associated communication technologies become increasingly available, affordable and
usable, these tools effectively enable forced migrants to negotiate political life across borders. This connection provides
a basis for resettled refugees to interact with their transnational networks and engage in political activities in novel ways.
This article presents a digital ethnography with 15 resettled refugees living in New Zealand and the role of social media
and transnational networks for the maintenance and creation of political lives. Taking a broad interpretation of how po-
litical and political life are understood, this article focuses on how power is achieved and leveraged to provide legitimacy
and control. In particular, it examines how refugees practise transnational politics through social media as they navigate
both the subjugation and subversion of power. These digital interactions have the potential to reconfigure and, at times
collapse, the distance between the resettled “here” and the transnational “there”. This article highlights how social media
facilitates political lives as an ongoing transnational phenomenon and its implications for the country of resettlement and
the wider diaspora.
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1. Introduction
Social media applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp,
Skype, Viber, Instagram, Twitter and a growing list of oth-
ers now deliver powerful platforms to connect forcedmi-
grants separated by distance. In particular, these tools
afford refugees the means to communicate and respond
to political ideas, events and crises in ways not pre-
viously possible. Through a variety of connective me-
dia, people can share and disseminate information, of-
fer support, generate social movements and sustain po-
litical activities. These platforms powerfully facilitate the
negotiation and creation of political lives and action
across borders.
This article considers what digitally mediated interac-
tions represent for resettled refugees as they negotiate
political lives across geographic distance during times of
rapid political, technological and social change. Follow-
ing Horst (2017), the emphasis on forced migrants as po-
litical subjects remains a largely absent presence inmuch
scholarship. In response, this study presents a digital
ethnography with 15 people from refugee backgrounds
living in New Zealand to highlight how digital technolo-
gies influence and enable political lives. Focussing on
how social media can sustain ongoing transnational net-
works and relationships, the article examines the subju-
gation and subversion of power as refugees negotiate on-
going transnational political activities and commitments
through everyday life.
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2. Forced Displacement, Politics and Digital Connection
Social media provides a number of platforms to en-
gage in and debate political issues through text-based,
audio, audio-visual, synchronous and asynchronous for-
mats. Such interactions are mediated through Facebook
posts, Twitter hashtags, WhatsApp encrypted chats and
numerous others. Benkler (2006) suggests that these
digital spaces represent a “networked public”, providing
a new space to discuss social and political issues. Con-
nected across distance through the digital environment,
this networked public has the potential to convey de-
bates to large audiences in rapid and persuasive ways
that range from the European refugee “crisis”, the in-
tegration of refugees, the securitisation of borders and
the politics of asylum. Such platforms offer individuals
and groups (defined within various social locations and
value positions) to engage with current events, dissemi-
nate news and mobilise forms of social action.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
([UNHCR], 2018) estimates that 68.5 million people are
currently forcibly displaced, a number which under-
scores themassive scale of physical separation from fam-
ily, friends and community. Despite this dislocation, mo-
bile communication technologies provide the opportu-
nity for ongoing connection across geographic distances.
Such developments are particularly illustrated by the
UNHCR (2016) report entitled “Connecting Refugees”
that highlights how 2G and 3G mobile coverage is now
available in many sites where forced migrants seek
refuge in camps and urban centres. The “networked ef-
fects” (Benkler, 2006) of increasingly, though unevenly,
available, affordable and usable communication path-
ways mean that these technologies have greater reach
and potential to connect and digitally reunite forcibly
displaced people as more are able to join their associ-
ated networks.
Over the last five years, the UNHCR has submitted
between 65,000 to 163,000 cases for resettlement—the
transfer of refugees from a country of asylum to an-
other state that agrees to provide permanent settle-
ment. These numbers represent a durable solution for
less than 1% of the world’s current forced migrants. In-
formation communication technologies, however, pro-
vide potential to connect this minority to the remain-
ing 99%. The UNHCR (2016) emphasises that those in
displacement sites can spend up to a third of their dis-
posable income on mobile communications. This real-
ity signals the importance, even necessity, of remaining
connected. Whilst the availability, affordability and us-
ability of such communication technologies remains un-
even (particularly in Africa and in rural sites of displace-
ment), it heralds new ways that displaced people can
practise transnational lives and politics in ways not previ-
ously possible.
Powerful actors shape refugees’ opportunities for
safety and belonging that include states, institutions,
non-government organisations and receiving societies.
A growing area of scholarship now focuses how digi-
tal communication technologies and social media pro-
vide a basis for refugees to have stronger roles as po-
litical actors—in countries of resettlement and transna-
tionally (Alencar, 2017; Benton & Glennie, 2016; Godin
& Doná, 2016; Marlowe, 2019). In particular, there is
an increasing recognition of refugees as conscious polit-
ical actors and the political nature of their flight (Horst,
2017). While the transfer of political remittances across
diasporas is not a new phenomenon, the speed at
which these can be provided through social media offers
new transformative possibilities and extended reach—
for forcedmigrants and powerful state actors (Krawatzek
& Funk, 2019).
The term “political” has been used in a variety of
contexts, including how refugees utilise social media to
discuss policy, influence elections and engage in various
forms of advocacy and activism in their country of origin
and the wider diaspora (Adan et al., 2018). However, the
term is used so uncritically that it often escapes defini-
tion. Taking a fairly broad interpretation of how political
and political life are understood, this article focuses on
how power is achieved and leveraged to influence gov-
ernment and associated structures that give it legitimacy
and control. In particular, it examines how social media
affords political inclusion and decision making that allow
refugees to practise transnational politics within, and be-
yond, national borders.
As people engage online, they are able to form as-
semblages or groups with shared interests. These as-
semblages and the rules that govern its membership
may be relatively stable or incredibly dynamic. In par-
ticular, it is necessary to examine how power is exer-
cised through the specific platforms (i.e., prohibiting or
censoring content) and by its members (administrator
rights to include/exclude participants, defining rules of
engagement, determining the flow of resources, provid-
ing support, etc.). The political activities that such groups
can achieve range from the mobilisation of ideas, shar-
ing resources and information, generating and coordinat-
ing large-scale socialmovements amongstmany others—
at times outside the control and awareness of power-
ful actors.
Schradie (2015) illustrates through the concept of or-
ganising ideology that digital activism can be directed to
a variety of stakeholders, which can yield different polit-
ical outcomes. In some cases, digitally mediated interac-
tion can predominantly have a bottom-up approach that
is participatory and tries to mobilise the masses. In oth-
ers, often through more top-down orientations, online
strategies are used as direct conduit to engage with pow-
erful and influential structures. These different political
strategies can significantly shape the outcomes of social
media campaigns. Thus, the access and use of digital plat-
forms highlights the complex terrain and possible affor-
dances that social media can provide (Leung, 2018).
For instance, the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia
and spread to numerous other countries was, in many
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ways, facilitated by the smart phone and the loading
of data onto various social media platforms (Breuer,
Landman, & Farquhar, 2015). During the 2011 Egyp-
tian protests that began in Tahrir Square, half of the
protestors communicated the event through social me-
dia and their phones to distribute content (Tufekci &
Wilson, 2012). Scholars demonstrate how social media
has been utilised to inform and respond to the European
refugee “crisis” through initiatives such as #RefugeesWel-
comeandothers that promote campaigns of fear andmis-
understanding (Barisione, Michailidou, & Airoldi, 2017).
Within countries of resettlement, numerous studies
acknowledge the importance of social media to facilitate
local bridging forms of social capital to assist with inte-
gration and transnational forms of bonding capital that
connect proximal and distant networks (Alencar, 2017;
Gillespie, Osseiran, & Cheesman, 2018; Leurs, 2017;
Marlowe, 2018). Adan et al. (2018) found, in a study of
100 Afghans living in the United Kingdom that nearly all
of them closely followed Afghan-based politics and that
some had begun lobbying for particular leaders to influ-
ence elections. This report also highlights how Somalis
settled in Sweden engage with more than 6,000 mem-
bers of the diaspora to discuss politics and development-
related issues occurring in Somalia. These studies illus-
trate how social media can powerfully connect people to
homelands, the wider diaspora and at times, local com-
munities in resettlement contexts.
These interactions support the formation of a
counter-public, a group that comes together to chal-
lenge dominant discourses, policy positions or values
(Fraser, 1990). For refugees, social media can provide
the medium to engage with an increasingly intimate, tex-
tured and influential transnational counter-public to re-
spond to political events occurring back home. It also
provides a “digital escape” whereby refugees can source
cultural and social capital that may not be readily acces-
sible in the geographic location where they live (Gifford
& Wilding, 2013). These trends highlight how the “con-
nected migrant” is able to maintain transnational links
and relationships that defy proximate geography and
censorship—people can incorporate such networks and
political commitments in instantaneous, intimate and on-
going ways (Diminescu, 2008).
The “openness” of such platforms, however, does
not always promote inclusivity. Numerous studies cau-
tion the role of social media to support integration out-
comes and a sense of belonging. These concerns range
from limiting refugees’ commitments and activities in ev-
eryday public life in settlement contexts to how state
actors can use these tools for surveillance, mass com-
munication and to exert influence and control (Gillespie
et al., 2018; Loh, 2016; Maitland, 2018). Other scholars
have noted how diaspora networks can potentially in-
flame tensions and destabilise peace-building activities
where diaspora networks can play both “constructive”
and “destructive” roles (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Orjuela, 2008;
Wilcock, 2018).
While social media opens new forms of communica-
tion and potential virtual spaces for forced migrants to
engage in political lives, it is also necessary to acknowl-
edge how these tools significantly extend the reach and
influence of the state. Glasius’ (2018) work on “extrater-
ritorial authoritarian practices”, for instance, powerfully
illustrates how regimes can expand their territorial con-
trol as social media increasingly influences dominant de-
bates and representations that advance regime interests
across borders. Michaelsen’s (2018) work illustrates this
trend by presenting how the Iranian state used transna-
tional communication as a way of controlling and moni-
toring the activities of exiles (horizontal voice) and influ-
encing international spaces and relations (vertical voice).
It clearly highlights the scale and potential of social me-
dia platforms to wield enormous power and control.
Moss (2018) refers to such practices as “digitally-enabled
transnational repression”.
The speed and accessibility that ideas can be com-
municated creates contexts where political activity can
be subjugated by the state, but it also supports oppor-
tunities where people can subvert such power and inno-
vate around it. These dynamics have stimulated the de-
velopment of complex social and political webs as many
refugees find themselves simultaneously connectedwith
the physical location of “here” and their transnational
“there” (including the homeland). It is within this aware-
ness and context that this study examines how resettled
refugees engage as transnational political actors through
a politics from below and a politics from above to navi-
gate power structures, belonging and everyday life.
3. Context and Study Design
New Zealand currently resettles 1,000 refugees as part
of its formal resettlement programme each year. Social
media can potentially digitally reunite these relatively
small numbers across significant geographic distance—
in this case across the seas. This article presents a digi-
tal ethnography (Murthy, 2008) of how 15 people from
refugee backgrounds who have resettled in New Zealand
engage in political lives through social media and what
it means to be connected to their countries of origin,
diaspora networks and country of settlement. Along-
side regular informal online meetings, the study data in-
clude 50 online interviews (Skype, Viber or WhatsApp),
two surveys and 472 social media diaries collected over
12 months. These ongoing interactions provided insight
into how participants incorporated political interactions
and activities through social media as it related to elec-
tions, conflicts, participating in rallies, human rights ac-
tivity and other political events. Using a constructivist
grounded theory methodology and informed by the con-
stant comparative method (Charmaz, 2006), it was pos-
sible to understand and theorise how participants’ polit-
ical lives took shape through the social media environ-
ment over time. This was achieved through the initial
and focussed coding processes that helped to generate
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categories related to political lives and the main concept
of negotiating power in everyday political lives. All data
were imported into NVivo for the focused coding process
to manage the large amount of qualitative data to en-
sure findings were theoretically saturated across partic-
ipants and various data sets. This iterative process over
time was supported through subsequent interviews as a
formof theoretical sampling,memowriting and informal
online interactions.
Eight females and seven males participated in the
study from a range of ethnonational backgrounds. Most
participants were well educated and all could communi-
cate in English to participate in the interviews and write
the online diaries. They were living across New Zealand
in the main refugee resettlement localities: Auckland,
Wellington, Christchurch, Nelson and Palmerston North.
Each participant completed three to four interviews
and wrote regular social media diaries in Qualtrics about
how they were using social media, with whom and for
what reasons. These ongoing forms of data collection
and points of interaction provided the basis for theoret-
ical sampling. Refugee-based organisations advertised
opportunities to participate in the study as a form of
third-party recruitment. Interested individuals then con-
tacted the principal investigator who then established
their social media practices and level of interaction with
transnational networks. Two participants did not com-
plete the study because the university decided halfway
through data collection that participantsmust be paid for
their time instead of providing them with grocery vouch-
ers (value of up $200 per month). The associated tax im-
plicationsmeant that these participants chose not to con-
tinue when the university (as opposed to the ethics com-
mittee) imposed this requirement. The study received
ethics approval from the associated tertiary institution
and required an additional two amendments to follow
the emergent analysis to ensure that theoretical sam-
pling related to the negotiation of political lives.
4. Findings
The exercise and negotiation of power plays an integral
role in determining how people are able to be political.
This section is divided into three parts: politics from be-
low; politics from above; and everyday political lives. The
participant quotes identify the person by number and at
times by ethno-national identification only if they agreed
to share this information due to concerns of safety for
themselves and/or their transnational networks. Com-
ments about gender and other social locations are made
more generally in the sections below and the discussion
that follows.
4.1. Politics from Below—Subversion
Participants identified social media as a tool to subvert
powerful structures and participate in political activities
relating to social change, awareness and action. While
the state’s power to surveil was something that all partici-
pants acknowledged,many found innovative approaches
to maintain political lives and activities. One participant
notes how they challenged power structures by working
with those in government who were secretly supporting
resistance efforts:
Those who are in the [government] system use social
media to convey a message. Even if it is top secret,
they would use this and then they will not be caught.
We share information because in some ways we are
trying to keep peace and then try to calm down the
situation [in home country] if it’s too high. We try to
keep the momentum in that way. (Participant 7, coun-
try not disclosed)
Yeah, I started a feminist group on social media. A lot
of my friends that are feminists have liked that page
and even people that I don’t even know have liked the
page so that keeps me connected with a lot of people
with the same passion as me and the same drive as
me in that specific subject. (Participant 2, Eritrea)
In another form of transnational political activity, a par-
ticipant notes how they administer group chats on Viber
andWhatsApp to reduce ethnic tensions in South Sudan.
It is daily I have to monitor people….Three days ago
I shut it down [group chats on Viber and WhatsApp]
because some people complained that there were
people sneaked in whomight be spies….I noticed that
some government agents using social media under a
different name. I didn’t know them and then I would
be told this is a spy. It’s not easy to identify but you
have a network too to identify them. (Participant 3,
South Sudan)
Other participants spoke of how they fedmisinformation
to undercover state agents to confuse them and obfus-
cate power structures. They found approaches to sub-
vert the state’s extended reach and influence on digi-
tal platforms.
The South Sudanese diaspora has been recognised as
a “global internet warriors” (LeRiche, 2016) due to their
transnational reach to respond to ethnic tensions related
to the ongoing civil war—for better and worse. As this
participant acknowledges:
I was identified as an “internet warrior” and I accept
that title. Because what we do, when the war broke,
those vulnerable people we used to transport them
because a lot of them were killed. Sometimes if I post
I may put a picture in there and people will com-
ment…start writing comments about that. I’m so care-
ful that I should not say anything that can incite a
war. That’s what I don’t want to do. (Participant 3,
South Sudan)
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What is clear is that involvement on social media can
escalate and de-escalate possibilities for violence and
provide opportunities for both safety and security. It is
also evident that several participants used social me-
dia as a means of communicating to international NGOs
and supra-national organisations to signal necessary re-
sponses to human rights violations and atrocities:
Last time, I contacted Amnesty International to help
them [people in Darfur]. Even from here, from New
Zealand. Amnesty International was involved and
communicated with me here to support them. (Par-
ticipant 1, Sudan)
For the participants who were highly active on social
media (at times online more than six hours a day),
they noted how they strategically used particular so-
cial media apps. For some, platforms such as WhatsApp
and Telegram provided encrypted communication that
made surveillance more difficult. At other times, these
same participants would disseminate information and
the communication of ideas to a wider audience through
Facebook and Instagram for greater impact.
I am focusing on our history [on Facebook] because
the young generation have not enough information
about our history. For example, how the Iranian gov-
ernment attacked our land for standing against the
Iranian government. And what’s our responsibility to-
wards our people, how we can make our history, how
we can build our culture because our culture is part of
our history. So we do think about those kind of things
and we do continue trying to get back our rights from
government. If we can, maybe…we will have [an] in-
dependent country again. (Participant 12, Iran)
I was added to a group on Viber called “Who is
Hussein” which is a global movement with represen-
tatives in over 60 cities worldwide. A representative
from New Zealand added about over 150 other peo-
ple mainly from Afghan Community to join in and be
a part of this campaign. The volunteers and represen-
tatives sign up to do multiple task from helping the
homeless and feeding the hungry, to donating blood
to save lives and their aim is to inspire and bring pos-
itive change to the world. I was active on this group
because I wanted to give something back to the soci-
ety. (Participant 5, Afghanistan, online diary)
Most of the examples provided demonstrate a politics
that was focussed on the bottom-up and participatory
processes that signals how social media it was usedmore
as a tool to engage the relatively powerless than attempt-
ing to reach the powerful (see Schradie, 2015). While
such activities have the potential to leverage social and
political change, participants rarely used such tools as a
conduit to engaging directly with the powerful. Their fo-
cus was more in trying to subvert power and hegemonic
structures that currently exist. I return to these implica-
tions in the discussion.
I spoke to my friend in Nepal involved with the elec-
tion activities lately. Their government is changing
and hoping that the new government will bring some
change which is very necessary. I don’t know what it
means but according to my friend, Nepal will have a
federal government now hopefully for better. Social
media enables me to understand many new things.
It is always helping me to grow. I know that I will
have many more things to learn from social media as
I come across every new day. (Participant 15, Bhutan,
online diary)
One of the purposes of participants’ political activ-
ity was to engage with dominant framings that pre-
sented issues they saw as unjust and oppressive. The
social media space effectively provided a counter-public
where interested groups could challenge powerful dis-
courses through information sharing and action. In the
next example, the participant focuses on how the Aus-
tralian government had framed asylum seekers in a neg-
ative light that justified oppressive offshore refugee sta-
tus processing:
I posted [on Instagram] about the event I attended
organised by Amnesty International to stand in soli-
darity with the men, women and children stuck in off-
shore detention centres on Manus and Nauru….I felt
very strong and passionate about what I was post-
ing because the detention of refugees on Manus and
Nauru is inhumane and a clear violation of their hu-
man rights. More people need to be aware, more peo-
ple need to stand out against it. As the neighbour,
NewZealand has a responsibility to domore.Weneed
to step up and point the finger when there are human
rights violations regardless of where they are occur-
ring. (Participant 10, Kurdish)
These comments support the view that settlement is
an ongoing transnational experience. They live both si-
multaneously “here” in New Zealand and their transna-
tional “there”. It highlights how assemblages formed on
social media have the potential to collapse geography,
bypass censorship and connect proximal and distant net-
works. The same can be said of powerful state actorswho
also have found ways to exert power through these digi-
tal platforms.
4.2. Politics from Above—Subjugation
This section focuses on the politics from above or the
ways in which political lives and opportunities are deter-
mined by government and powerful structures. In most
cases, participants noted a concern of discussing politics
as it could have negative impacts for their friends and
family in their countries of origin.
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We avoid that [talking politics], honestly…because it
is a big problem because every now and then—they
[Government] arrest someone. If they hear you speak
or talk about any political or something that they
might not like, then theywill arrest you. (Participant 9,
Syria)
No,we are quite careful.We almost don’t do anything,
don’t talk about any topic about politics, anything pol-
itics….I do refrain from expressing ideas more openly.
(Participant 6, background not disclosed)
Sometimes some people say it’s not safe to talk about
security things or it’s not safe to talk about politics
and stuff like that. Normally we’re not talking about
those kinds of things and just we are talking about
normal conversation. (Participant 8, Afghanistan, on-
line diary)
For others, they noted that discussing politics could have
negative ramifications for their opportunities to return
home or to travel to certain countries thereby constrain-
ing their agency to fully voice their views and concerns.
In this quote, the participant emphasises how their so-
cial media involvement is mediated by the awareness of
potential mobility restrictions:
I find that I’ve stepped away from criticising the [Turk-
ish] regime as a whole and rather to focus on partic-
ular events and acts…I have to go to Turkey to see
my family. With the current situation in Iraq borders
with the Kurdish airports closed there is a chance
that those won’t reopen for a while. (Participant 10,
Kurdish)
The power of the politics from above is such is that sev-
eral participants consented to participate only if their
country of origin and other demographics were not dis-
closed. It demonstrates the perceived and actual reach
of state apparatus to surveil, oppress and control within
and across borders.
Yes, we can follow everything through Internet here,
through news but you know, it is very critical…people
there are scared and afraid to talk about such issues
because they are afraid…we may talk about general
issues but we don’t go into details. When I talk to my
friend in Europe or other countries I feel free to talk
about these issues and details, but not in Syria. (Par-
ticipant 9, Syria)
The associated reach meant that several participants
(predominantly female) were explicitly non-political in
their social media activities.
It depends [on] the secret service policy and strat-
egy. If they want to annoy me through my relatives
or my beloved, they can. They can easily find a way,
especially if…I say something political on WhatsApp,
they can make it…a reason to, for example arrest my
friends, my family even. Yeah. So I avoid talking about
politics with my family and friends there, for their
safety. (Participant 12, Iran)
I stay away from politics. I’m not a politic[al] person.
Just to know what’s happening in my country. (Partic-
ipant 8, Afghanistan)
However, even for these participants, they did note the
use of code words that they could use to signify political
events or when it was unsafe to have contact with their
transnational networks. They offered examples where
they could make reference to the government as a sport-
ing team to seem like they were talking about every-
day sports to reduce the likelihood of state surveillance
and monitoring.
For these “non-political” participants, however, it did
appear that political lives did creep in over the 12months
of working with them. Whether this was in relation to a
local election, concerns of what was happening in their
country of origin or some other development, it became
clear that adopting a political life was one of strategy and
at times, necessity. What becomes evident in these com-
ments is that political lives are at times incredibly inter-
twined with everyday lives. While, at times, participants’
activities were explicitly and purposefully “political”, at
others, these activities overlap with such commitments
in fleeting and multipurpose ways.
4.3. Everyday Political Lives
Data analysis revealed that maintaining regular, often
daily, social media interaction related to political activ-
ity with transnational networks was foundational to well-
being in resettlement contexts that linked people to the
country of resettlement (here) and their country of ori-
gin/residence and the wider diaspora (there). Partici-
pants were unequivocal about its role in helping them
and other refugees to integrate by giving them a sense
of ongoing purpose.
Social media is really one of the important life aspects
nowadays in New Zealand and all over theworld. Even
in the conflict area nowadays are using it….We can say
this is one of the most important things in the life of
the people, in this era. (Participant 1, Sudan)
[Being online] mademe feel like I was still a part of so-
ciety and made me feel included and caught up with
everyone else. Social media is a simple network that
keeps you keep updated in every imperative event
that happens both within New Zealand and outside
New Zealand. (Participant 2, Eritrea)
I spoke to my friend in Nepal and we discussed about
Nepal’s political situations and the struggles every per-
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son has to go through tomake a simple living.We also
discussed about New Zealand’s new prime minister.
I told my friend about my participation in voting. (Par-
ticipant 15, Bhutan, online diary)
As political activities on socialmedia become intertwined
with everyday lives, all participants noted how being con-
nected to those they are separated from by geograph-
ical distance was essential to well-being and participa-
tion in resettlement contexts. The survey responses from
participants generally showed that twelve of the fifteen
estimated spending one to four hours a day on social
media. This was generally supported by what was com-
municated in the diaries and interviews. However, on
many occasions it was clear that these activities could
easily extend into eight hours or more a day depending
on particular cultural, political, religious or social events
that were occurring. One participant demonstrated how
transnational care and support is tied to political activi-
ties and discussions:
We discussed what’s happening in Iraq with so called
Islamic State andMosul.Most of themen in our family
are Peshmerga and away in Mosul. They were giving
us updates from the ground about how bad things are
in the region. We were discussing the current talk of
a referendum for an independent Kurdish state and
how likely that would be, the ongoing issues with
Turkey and how the different Kurdish political par-
ties that can’t seem to agree about anything….But it
is very frightening to imagine how close my uncles
and cousins are to the conflict and the risk[s]. (Partic-
ipant 10, Kurdish)
As these interactions become increasingly inculcated
into everyday lives, it also influences how participants
access news. Nearly all participants said the principal
way that they accessed news events and information
was through their social media feeds (along with several
trusted news networks). Their networks were typically
composed of people who shared similar views, a high
proportion of which often came from similar social loca-
tions related to age, gender and ethno-national identi-
fications leading to a potential confirmation bias where
people gravitate to perspectives that align with their val-
ues and views.
I have been using Facebook to keep on track onwhat’s
going on around the world and even in New Zealand
with the election updates. I found it so much easier
scrolling my news feed and glancing at the new up-
dates which gave me quick information about elec-
tions. I don’t watch TV much, so social media is how
I keep on track with political matters. (Participant 2,
Eritrea)
Several participants were aware of this confirmation bias
as a form of interaction where access to information is
shared between limited networks of “friends” on their
associated social media profiles.
So I think the problem with that is unless things get
shared really widely you are just preaching to people
who already are open to your views. So, you are not
necessarily influencing those that you perhaps need
to influence. (Participant 10, Kurdish)
Participants were asked where they accessed news and
this largely reinforced this confirmation bias—the pre-
dominant sources of information were through their so-
cial network channels. While participants noted trusting
other news sources such as BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN and Fox
News, most emphasised that news reached them most
quickly through their social media feeds.
First in Facebook, then I will go on newspapers. I don’t
have TV in my current place. I’d rather do Facebook
news. (Participant 11, Sri Lanka)
Every day, I check my Facebook and people, they
are posting things about Afghanistan, about culture,
about news, about events, almost about everything.
(Participant 8, Afghanistan)
Yeah, if I’m concerned with something I would go on
Facebook because usually that’s the first place that
I can use so I’m like okay, if it’s on Facebook then it’s
actually happening. (Participant 2, Eritrea)
I’m on Twitter every day. I follow people that are
working in the same area as me. I’m making sure
I’m keeping upwith any development. (Participant 14,
Rwanda)
And finally, for some participants, where ongoing con-
flicts and persecution are not occurring or as prevalent in
their homelands, their everyday political lives may take
different shapes and engender different commitments.
The social media has brought massive changes in so-
cial life. (Participant 3, South Sudan)
In addition to providing a basis to enact their citizen-
ship and political lives overseas, there is also evidence
that participation on social media can support a sense of
meaning and integration in the country of resettlement.
While there are potential concerns that ongoing transna-
tional interactions could be a disincentive to engagewith
everyday lives and local politics in countries of resettle-
ment, participants were nearly unequivocal of its impor-
tance to meaningfully settle in New Zealand.
The study findings also highlight how social media
effectively collapses physical geographies of distance
through incorporating increasingly intimate transna-
tional interactions and political commitments into every-
day lives. It is important to recognise that the participants
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of this study were generally well educated and fluent in
English. Their experiences of social media could be in
stark contrast to other people from refugee backgrounds
whomay not have the sameaccess to various forms of lin-
guistic, social and cultural capital. However, participants
were asked to speak on their perspectives of their eth-
nic based community and noted the centrality of social
media for the maintenance of social relations, a sense of
belonging and for providing purpose through new ways
of engaging in political issues in countries of origin. They
also provided examples where they taught their parents
and other community members who spoke limited En-
glish to use socialmediawith transnational networks and
how this inculcated everyday transnational interactions.
Thus, while the contexts and situations for refuge differ,
the increasingly accessible opportunities for digital con-
nection open further possibilities for the enactment of
transnational settlement and online political action.
As was seen over the 12-month study, the articula-
tion of political lives had ebbs and flows that responded
to the everyday contexts of transnational lives. At times,
these political commitments were intimately woven into
people’s everyday lives and at others, were largely non-
existent. In many cases, the enactment of political lives
through social media facilitated counter-publics of be-
longing, opportunities to challenge dominant discourses
and the possibility of mobilising the masses. Thus, it
is clear that social media represents a communication
tool that creates new opportunities for the exercise of
power to subjugate particular groups. It also offers novel
approaches to subvert and innovate against powerful
structures, though often not directly. Such activities high-
light the new affordances and cautions that communi-
cation technologies provide—effectively reshaping polit-
ical lives and action.
5. Discussion
Social media is increasingly part of people’s everyday
lives and has powerful potential to shape and rein-
force political ideas and practices. Whether refugees are
translating news from one language to another, repost-
ing trusted information, participating in protest or en-
gaging in events happening back home—the reality is
that refugee settlement is, for many people, an ongo-
ing transnational experience. So too, are the ways that
refugees live their political lives.
Through practices of resistance and innovation,
refugees are able to forge counter-publics to dominant
framings and oppressive authoritarian practices. While
not arguing for some sort of digital utopia, it was clear
across all participants that social media is intimately em-
bedded in their sense of belonging that connects them
from the place of resettlement to their homelands. For
many, the incorporation of political lives is an important
part of these interactions that highlight the need to con-
sider refugee resettlement that occurs simultaneously
with proximal and distant networks.
The data presented show that refugees can be “dual
political actors” (Adan et al., 2018) where social me-
dia provides refugees the opportunity to live their lives
both “here” and “there”. In some instances, the space be-
tween this binary is collapsed as people live increasingly
sophisticated everyday lives in more than one location
through social media platforms. Alencar’s (2017) work
on social media illustrates how online interactions influ-
ence the experience of refugee integration and how it is
communicated across society through various forms of
social capital that provide opportunities to reinforce, and
at times, transcend difference. It means thinking through
how integration is defined as ongoing transnational com-
mitments, relationships and activities coincide with ev-
eryday local life.
For many refugees, regular and reliable access to
transnational networks is a growing and an integral part
of settlement that sustains and supports people’s over-
all well-being. The involvement of political lives provides
the basis for people to connect through common lan-
guage, culture and history with transnational networks.
It effectively creates a space where resettled refugees
are not necessarily positioned as the “other” that gen-
erate possibilities to practise a politics from below and
challenge the dominant and hegemonic framings. Impor-
tantly, such interactions provide opportunities to have
a voice in situations where forced migrants are often si-
lenced. As the examples in this article illustrates, partic-
ipants generally used social media to exercise political
lives froma bottom-up approach but seldomemployed it
as a means to communicate with or influence structures
directly. Their political lives often tried to avoid the state
or perhaps to misinform it, but rarely to communicate
with it in a direct sense.
This study also reinforces how social media provides
a pathway for powerful actors and institutions (often the
state) to exert power within and across borders. Govern-
ments and other institutions can use such tools to predict
population movements, collect massive amounts of per-
sonal data, convey dominant discourses and exert con-
trol that powerfully inform people’s mobilities and every-
day lives. However, state actors can also use online tech-
nologies in liberating and empowering ways. There are
numerous examples of how government and other insti-
tutions are using social media platforms to help refugees
integrate and inform them of their rights (Adan et al.,
2018; Gillespie et al., 2018; Maitland, 2018). Such initia-
tives can provide a foundation for the enactment of local
and transnational political lives.
Current examples include supporting Canada’s pri-
vate sponsorship programme through digital communi-
cation technologies, apps across Europe designed to as-
sist refugees and asylum seekers with integration, and
groups such as Techfugees that look for digital solutions
to the problems associated with forced displacement
(see Benton & Glennie, 2016; Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver,
& Vonk, 2018; Lepeska, 2016). Receiving states can also
engage with resettled refugees to assist them with elec-
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toral processes and other forms of decision making (see
Adan et al., 2018). While such actions can obviously con-
nect people dislocated and separated by distance, it may
also improve resettled refugees’ sense of place in their
host country—something powerfully emphasised by the
participants in this study. Such processes could create
pathways for greater social inclusion and participation in
local politics and communication across difference. The
associated possibilities include training people in how
to use social media, addressing the sources of digital in-
equality, subsidising costs to access the internet and pro-
viding development assistance to develop and build nec-
essary infrastructure to connect refugees’ proximal and
distant networks.
It is important to stress that technological solutions
to dislocation and political voice are not necessarily
the best, or even desirable, solution. There were as-
sumptions that the web 2.0 would democratise infor-
mation and broaden debate—including in the area of
politics. The confirmation bias of people seeking views
that support entrenched political and value positions is
a prime example. Many social media feeds are popu-
lated with people “like us” that create echo chambers,
which can stifle necessary debate and proliferate fake
news as “truth” (Sunstein, 2018). The reality is that
“friends” interact on a given platform because they of-
ten have similar values. It means that information can
become incredibly homogenised and narrowed. These
networked publics can limit opportunity to engage with
alternative perspectives—something very much needed
in the heated debates that occur about displacement
and asylum.
Digital inequality provides serious cautions about
who is able to access information, support and rela-
tionships as content and opportunities are increasingly
linked to digital forms of connection. In many respects,
digital illiteracy can represent a new form of poverty
where those who are not able to engage are increas-
ingly left behind. Thus, as the participants in this study
have high levels of education and English language com-
petency, it is also necessary to recognise that the op-
portunities for the enactment of political lives through
digital technologies is powerfully informed by its associ-
ated usability, affordability and availability. It is also nec-
essary to acknowledge that not everyone is political. And
even fewer would actively engage with online political
lives in the way this article has defined it: how power is
achieved and leveraged to influence government and the
associated structures that give it legitimacy and control.
For some, this would be because of concerns of safety
and security—for themselves and their transnational re-
lations. For others, it relates to a disinterest or reaction to
previous political processes that created their forced mi-
gration journey in the first place. Despite these concerns,
the increasing reality is that refugees live both “here”
and “there” and that the spaces between this binary are
becoming more nuanced and complex.
6. Conclusion
The digital environment facilitated through social media
is effectively reconfiguring, and at times collapsing, the
associated boundaries and borders for the realisations of
political life. While the risks to participation are real due
to fear of reprisal and persecution, refugees have found
ways to subjugate hegemonic power and to find various
forms of political involvement from information sharing
to bold forms of political action and activism. Such inter-
actions offer possibilities for peace building and politi-
cal participation in countries of origin. It can also influ-
ence how resettled refugees meaningfully feel “in place”
within their country of resettlement.
These developments herald a need for methodologi-
cal innovation that extends beyond borders and captures
the digital everyday lives of people forcibly separated
and displaced. It highlights the importance of going be-
yond “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer & Schiller,
2003) or the tendency to approach a research question
bounded by national borders. It also signals a new ethics
in practice where onemust be responsive to participants
and their transnational networks, particularly in situa-
tions of ongoing precarity. As online methods continue
to proliferate and capture new forms of data, there is
a need to consider how people’s safety and well-being
is ensured. These comments highlight a further commit-
ment to ethical responsivenesswhen understanding how
forced migrants use technology to negotiate various so-
cial locations, geographic distance, political action and
craft meaningful lives and livelihoods across borders.
The fact that refugees maintain contact with their
transnational networks is not a new phenomenon. The
availability, accessibility and usability of social media
platforms, however, opens new possibilities for the
reach and shape of refugee’s transnational relationships
and networks. These trends also highlight that govern-
ments have powerful digital tools for surveillance, pre-
dicting migratory movements and pathways, influencing
humanitarian actions, and collecting massive swathes of
information. Thus, a suite of risks and reservations ac-
company the new possibilities and affordances of digi-
tal communications. These platforms facilitate the nego-
tiation of everyday lives, power and relationships. Ignor-
ing these accelerating trends fails to recognise that many
refugees maintain ongoing transnational political lives.
Such realities have significant ramifications for countries
of origin, countries of resettlement, the wider diaspora
and the possibilities of forced migration futures.
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